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Abstract
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such
as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced com-
binatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as
incentive-compatible as possible. This paper offers a new characteri-
zation of approximate incentive-compatibility by casting the pricing
problem as a meta-game between the center and the participating
agents. Through a suitable set of simplifications, we describe the equi-
librium of this game as a variational problem. We use this to char-
acterize the space of optimal prices, enabling closed-form solutions in
restricted cases, and numerically-determined prices in the general case.
We offer theory motivating this approach, and numerical experiments
showing its application.
1 Introduction
Market mechanisms increase the welfare of their participants by enabling the
transfer of goods and services from those with low value for their holdings
to those with high value for those resources. For transacting large numbers
of identical goods (like stocks), the double auction formats used in financial
markets work very well. However, there are many contexts in which goods
are not uniform and participants value different bundles of goods in complex
ways, and we thus need a more complex design. This paper offers a novel
way to frame the problem of constructing mechanisms in these complex set-
tings, and then instantiates several concrete cases and solves them. The
resulting mechanisms reduce the level of strategic manipulation of bids in
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equilibrium, which decreases the cognitive load of participants, in turn low-
ering the barrier to agent participation and, even more importantly, raising
the overall efficiency of the outcome implemented.
1.1 Combinatorial Mechanisms
Combinatorial mechanisms are designed for settings where the allocation of
multiple goods to multiple participants is required, and where the partici-
pants value packages of goods at either greater or less than their constituant
parts. A prominent domain where such complex mechanisms are needed is
in markets for the transfer of billions of dollars of radio spectrum rights
from governments around the world to mobile phone carriers (Kwerel and
Williams 2002). In such markets different frequency blocks have different
properties and thus different values; and a single frequency in different geo-
graphical regions also can have wildly different values. Bidders are interested
in packages across various geographic areas in order to implement regional
or national business plans. Other such examples include the transfer of air-
craft landing rights at airports (Ball et al. 2006), complex procurement and
logistics markets (Sandholm 2007), and the lease of computational resources
in large-scale datacenters (Guevara et al. 2014).
Most of the mechanisms that have been designed for these settings are
Combinatorial Auctions (CA). In CAs the goods are all offered by a single
seller, while multiple buyers use an expressive bidding language to state
their bid for different bundles of goods to the mechanism. The mechanism
clears the market by determining the welfare-maximizing allocation at the
buyer reports, and then charges these winning bidders according to a specific
payment rule, which will be a central concern of this paper. If instead (1)
there is more than one seller; (2) these sellers are allowed to specify complex
reserve values over the goods they are offering; and (3) participants can
both buy and sell simultaneously – then this two-sided market is called a
Combinatorial Exchange (CE).
Unlike the CAs that have been widely adopted, CEs have not been widely
used. This is so, despite the need to reallocate goods in these same settings
in secondary markets that are thus by definition two-sided in nature. For
example, the upcoming “Incentive Auction” planned by the FCC is intended
to facilitate reallocation of spectrum between firms, each of which have com-
binatorial preferences (FCC 2014). The FCC plans to run a reverse auction
to recapture rights from existing holders followed by a forward CA to offer
these rights to new owners. However, this design precludes participants from
swapping one set of goods for another without potentially selling their goods
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and subsequently failing to obtain new goods. A full CE would solve this
problem, but such designs have rarely been proposed (Lubin et al. 2008).
One reason for this is a lack of consensus about how best to price them.
The famed VCG mechanism may run at a deficit for CEs, precluding its
use without undesirable subsidies; the Core may be empty for CEs, mean-
ing that the pricing rules that have recently gotten much attention in CAs
(c.f. UK bandwidth auctions (Cramton 2013)) are also not available. Our
method provides high-quality pricing rules for CEs, enabling their possible
use in these billion dollar markets.
1.2 The Problem With Payment Rules
When designing a combinatorial mechanism, there are design challenges
in specifying the bidding language, a tractable winner-determination algo-
rithm, and effective activity rules. But it is the payment rule that directly
mediates the economic and game-theoretic aspects of the mechanism. The
study of payment rules is thus of paramount importance, and is our focus
here. Specifically, there are a number of desirable properties we would like
our payment rules to have:
Individual Rationality (IR) Ex-post, individual bidders prefer to have
participated in the mechanism, rather than remained outside it. Con-
cretely, this means bidders receive only weakly positive profits at their
reported values.
(Weak) Budget Balance (BB) The total payments paid by bidders to
the mechanism is weakly greater than the total disbursements by the
mechanism; e.g. no subsidy is required to run the mechanism.
Incentive Compatibility (IC) In equilibrium, bidders should not have to
strategize in submitting their bids; e.g. stating one’s value truthfully
should yield the maximum profit.
In addition to these properties of the payment rule, we are interested in
mechanisms that use the most natural winner determination rule, one that
implements the total value-maximizing allocation at the bids. In conjunction
with incentive compatibility, this yields a mechanism offering:
Efficiency (Eff) The mechanism implements the total value-maximizing
allocation at the participant’s true values.
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For CAs, only one mechanism satisfies all four of these properties: the
famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auction (Nisan 2007), which is a gen-
eralization of the second-price or Vickrey (Vickrey 1961) auction to settings
with combinatorial preferences. In VCG, a participant pays his bid, less
his marginal impact on the main economy (i.e., the difference in social wel-
fare between the main economy and the economy where the participant is
omitted). However, as has often been pointed out (Ausubel and Milgrom
2006), VCG yields very low revenue to the seller in the CA setting, which in
turn creates incentives for undesirable behavior on the part of participants –
for example, sybil attacks, where a single firm bids under several identities.
Further, VCG payments in a CA can be outside the Core (Shapley and Scarf
1974). This means that VCG prices may be sufficiently low that, ex-post,
the seller may prefer to transact with a coalition of the bidders at a price
higher than VCG, rather than accept the VCG outcome.
To get around these problem, the most recent spectrum auctions have
been built around pricing rules that implement prices in the core, and thus
which may derive substantially more revenue than VCG (Day and Milgrom
2008). However, as soon as prices are chosen to obey the Core constraints,
we will have to relax one of our aforementioned other properties. In this
work, we choose to relax the incentive-compatibility property.
For CEs, the situation is even worse. Even without core constraints,
the seminal Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility theorem (Myerson and Sat-
terthwaite 1983) tells us that no design can manifest our desired four proper-
ties (IR, BB, IC, Eff) simultaneously in this setting.1 Again, it is necessary
to relax one of the four conditions. Because IR, BB and Eff are typically
considered hard constraints, we again choose to relax IC.
Even designs that are not explicitly combinatorial in nature can have
similar problems. For example, the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction
(Edelman et al. 2007) used by the major search engines to sell the links in the
sponsored section of their results pages is not equivalent to VCG, and thus
is not IC. In this case, while VCG is available, we are restricted from using it
by a constraint on the simplicity of the mechanism (e.g. single-dimensional
prices). One instead might want a mechanism that is maximally IC, while
still obeying a constraint on simplicity.
In all these cases, what we want is a mechanism that from the partici-
pant’s perspective looks like VCG. However, we want to charge something
slightly greater than VCG in order to meet the other other requirements
1In CEs, the core is often empty, so it is not typically considered in defining payments.
However, it is possible to include it by instead targeting the minimal −core (or nucleolus).
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of the domain (e.g. to be in the core of a CA, attain budget balance in
a CE, or maintain simplicity in the sponsored search setting). Charging
this extra amount will mean, of necessity, that our mechanism will not be
IC. And consequently, the complex problem presented in this paper reduces
to the simple question of: for each participant, how much more than VCG
should we charge? But, this is far from straightforward, because (1) it is not
clear by what measure we should define “as close to incentive compatible as
possible,” and (2), having chosen a measure, it is typically an intractable
optimization problem to find the optimal prices.
In this paper, we will propose a new way to define approximate incentive-
compatibility, carefully chosen so as to capture the essential aspects of the de-
sign problem, while simultaneously being computationally tractable enough
that the design problem can be solved.
1.3 Our Solution
The goal of this paper, then, is finding good approximately incentive-compatible
prices, with a focus on the CE setting. In service of this goal, we begin with
a new definition of approximate incentive compatibility. Such a definition
requires a model for the information set employed by participants when they
devise their strategy (Lubin and Parkes 2012). Traditionally this is either (1)
ex-ante, where the agent knows only the distribution over all agent values;
(2) ex-interim, where each agent additionally knows his own values exactly;
or (3) ex-post, where all bidders have complete information. Instead, we
model bidders as being boundedly informed about the values in the setting.
Specifically, we introduce the concept of a blinding distribution, used to ap-
proximate ex-interim prices, while retaining the tractability of ex-ante and
ex-post formulations.
A key insight of the paper is that when mechanisms are used in practice,
payoffs are generally drawn from a distribution about which participants
have imperfect knowledge. Thus by moving from the traditional framework
where participants reason about values, to one where they reason about
payoffs (which is, what they ultimately care about), we obtain a very useful
dimensionality reduction which we can leverage computationally to better
be able to minimize the incentive to manipulate bids. In this sense, the
present paper generalizes VCG to the more restrictive settings described
above.
Based on this new information definition, we then frame the resulting ap-
proximate IC pricing problem as a variational calculus problem, the solution
of which is a novel payment rule for domains where VCG isn’t available. The
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full formulation can be interpreted as a Bayesian Stackelberg game (Simaan
and Cruz Jr. 1973), where the mechanism designer moves first by picking the
parameters of the game to be played so as to make it as incentive compatible
as possible, and the participants then attempt to obtain as much individual
gain as they can within this game. The chosen rules and resulting optimal
agent-strategies will be the equilibria of this Stackelberg meta-game. How-
ever, because the game is a stochastic game with an infinite strategy space
it is not tractable to solve for the Stackelberg equilibrium, and we therefore
adopt a simpler Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept for our solution.
Having constructed this model, we then offer a description of the space
of optimal rules and game equilbria consistent with the formulation, using
variational methods. This analysis permits us to critique several existing
rules from the literature on a theoretical basis. We close by providing multi-
ple examples of numerical solutions to the variational pricing problem, and
characterize these solutions.
In most cases, the rules obtained cannot be described in closed form,
and must be determined computationally. However, provided suitable dis-
tributions are available to instantiate the information model, the methods
provided can readily be employed to furnish an alternative to VCG that is
as incentive-compatible as possible, and thus as efficient as possible, given
the need to satisfy other hard constraints that preclude the direct use of
VCG.
2 Theory
Many payment rules for combinatorial mechanisms have been proposed in
the literature. We briefly review these, by way of motivating our method
for achieving approximate incentive compatibility.
Parkes et al. (2001) provide the Threshold rule, which minimizes the
maximum ex-post regret across agents. Several basic rules are also defined
therein: Small, which gives all surplus to those with little of it; and Large,
which does the opposite, among other rules. Each of these rules is optimal
relative to a specified metric of payoffs at reported values. However, the
analysis is not in BNE, and thus it is not clear which rule actually yields
the best incentives or the highest efficiency when agents strategize. Lubin
and Parkes (2009) propose a Reference rule, that seeks to minimize the
KL-Divergence between the distribution on payoffs in the reference (e.g.
VCG) and in the implemented mechanism, and show that rules with payoff
distributions similar to the reference will have similar incentive properties in
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equilibrium. The work also evaluates the Threshold, Small and Large rules
in approximate BNE, and finds that among the rules tested, Small often
works well. However, Small gives no discount at all to those bidders who
get the most under VCG, and is thus hard to argue for in practice. Further,
the 2009 paper evaluates only a small set of fixed rules. The present work
shows, on the other hand, that we can do better by considering a broader set
of possibilities, especially rules with no closed form that must be determined
computationally.
Erdil and Klemperer (2010) define a rule that minimizes the marginal
incentive to deviate from truthful bidding over small misreports, arguing
that this is a minimal condition for approximate strategyproofness. How-
ever, paper is silent on what to do when larger misreports are optimal for
participants, given the nature of the underlying domain and design con-
straints. By contrast, the present work handles situations where even very
large deviations from truthful bidding are strategically elicited in the best
responses of bidders.
A different thread of work has sought not closed-form rules, but rules
that can be calculated algorithmically, as proposed here. Conitzer and Sand-
holm’s Automated Mechanism Design (2004) captures the full design, includ-
ing allocations and payments, within this numerical framework, but can only
solve small problems, given the high computational complexity. Empirical
Mechanism Design (Vorobeychik et al. 2006, 2007) parametrizes the design
space and then uses computational techniques to find optimal parameter
settings. This is similar in spirit to the approach taken herein. However,
rather than fitting the parameters of specific functions, we instead formulate
our version of the payment problem in the calculus of variations and, lack-
ing a closed-form solution, perform computation from there. (Variational
calculus goes all the way back to Bernoulli, but the major development was
by Euler and Lagrange in the 18th century; a good overview of variational
methods is provided by Smith (Smith 1998).)
Finally, we point the reader to recent work by Nisan et al. (2011), which
identifies auction settings where, under certain informational assumptions,
player best-response dynamics will lead to the efficient outcome even without
fully IC prices. One view of the present work is as a generalization of this idea
to settings that are only approximately IC. Another approach to avoiding
complexity is to create a replication economy by increasing the number of
players and goods in order to “wash out” local effects. This is the method
employed by the related method of Strategyproofness in the large (Azevedo
and Budish 2012); by contrast, we reason about the unmodified economy
directly.
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2.1 Preliminaries
Although our ideas are more broadly applicable, for simplicity we will here
focus on Combinatorial Exchanges (CEs). Formally, we have a set of {1..m} ∈
M goods and {1...n} ∈ N agents. Each agent has an initial endowment
Ei ⊆ M ∶ ⋂Ei = ∅, and a true value vi(λi) ∈ R for each potential trade
λi ∈ P(M) of goods they might buy or sell.2 We will denote those goods
bought λBi and those sold λ
S
i ∶ λBi ∪ λSi = λi, and the vector of such trades
as λ ∈ Λ. Because of the Revelation Principal (Myerson 1979), we may re-
strict ourselves to mechanisms where agents state a claim of value (bid) on
a potential bundle; however, we must capture that they may still choose to
report untruthfully as vˆi(λi) ≠ vi(λi). To simplify notation, we will refer to
V (⋅) = ∑i vi(⋅) and Vˆ (⋅) = ∑i vˆi(⋅); we use V-i(⋅) and Vˆ-i(⋅) for the value of
all agents but i. We are concerned with mechanisms that implement the ef-
ficient outcome at reports, e.g. arg maxλ∈Λ∑i∈N vˆi(λi) subject to feasibility∑i∈N I(g ∈ λBi ) ≤ ∑i∈N I(g ∈ λSi ) ∀g ∈M , and restricted endowment λSi ⊆ Ei.
We denote such an efficient trade as λ∗, and with a slight abuse of notation,
v∗i (vˆi) as the value to the agent i of the efficient trade when he reports vˆi,
and similarly for V ∗(vˆ).
Our mechanism will also charge each agent payments pi, and we note that
these may be negative (for e.g. sellers or swappers) in a CE setting. Without
loss, we can describe prices by a discount instead, where pi = vˆi(λ∗i )−∆i for
some ∆i specified by the payment rule. We will consider settings of quasi-
linear utility; e.g., an agent’s utility or profit is given by pii(λ) = vi(λi) − pi.
We will sometimes parametrize this as pii(vi, vˆi, vˆ-i), or the agent’s profit
when he has true value vi, reports vˆi, and all other agents’ reports vˆ-i.
The well known VCG mechanism uses as its discount the marginal im-
pact of the agent, e.g. the difference in social welfare between the main
economy and the economy where the agent is omitted. Formally: ∆V CGi =
Vˆ ∗(vˆ) − Vˆ ∗-i (vˆ-i). We note that the VCG discount enables us to find the
critical value, vCi (λ∗i ) = vi(λ∗i )−∆V CGi , which is the minimum agent i could
have bid while still winning λi when all vˆ-i are held fixed. This choice of
payment is individually rational (pii(λ∗i ) ≥ 0∀i), and strategyproof (agents
have a dominant strategy to report vˆi = vi). However, as mentioned in the
introduction, in a CE setting VCG is not (weak) budget-balanced in Bayes-
Nash Equilibrium (BNE) (∃vˆ ∶ ∑i pi ≤ 0, requiring the center to subsidize
the outcome).3
2Without loss we will assume unique goods; all points generalize to the case of multiple
identical items.
3 A consequence of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility theorem (Myerson and
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2.2 Defining Approximate Incentive Compatibility
As was mentioned in the introduction, we want a mechanism consistent with
this CE setup that implements the efficient allocation at reports, and which
uses a payment rule that is individually rational and budget-balanced. But
we know that to do this we will have to give up the property of incentive
compatibility. Consequently, we seek a rule that yields maximal efficency
at the reported values in practice. To do this, we will want the ratio of
total value in the allocation at reported values and at true values to be
as close to one as possible, e.g. V(λˆ)/V(λ∗ → 1. A rule that yields the
closest such limit, we deem to be approximately incentive compatible, and
is our overall goal. More concretely, we need to specify: (a) what types
of misreporting a participant can perform and (b) what information the
participant has when deciding how to misreport (i.e. the nature of the BNE).
For the setting outlined in the previous section, (a) is simple: we allow for
all possible misreports vˆi(λi); e.g., particupants may state some other value
than the truth for all bundles λi. The information-set (b), though, requires
explication.
2.2.1 Participant Information-Sets
Because we are doing our analysis in full BNE, if the information-set is
complex, then evaluating equilibrium is likewise computationally complex,
and often prohibitively so. Consequently a number of proposals have been
made in the literature for simple information-sets that lead to tractable
analysis of the degree of misreporting, making the problem of finding the
degree of efficiency loss solvable, and thus making design under the given
approximate IC criterion possible. (See Appendix A for details, and Lubin
and Parkes (2012) for a longer discussion.)
The simplest approach is to assume that participants are fully informed
about all values in the market. Because this sort of analysis is using infor-
mation that is typically available only after the mechanism is complete (even
for decisions that are made up front), it is often referred to as an ex-post
analysis. Consequently, this choice of information-set collapses our BNE
calculation to a normal Nash equilibrium. While appealing for simplicity
and computational reasons, it is highly unrealistic in many settings.
Instead, one can assume that participants make their strategic decisions
when they have no more than an expectation as to the values in the market.
In such an ex-ante model, the participant has only probabilistic informa-
Satterthwaite 1983).
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tion about his own value. This is unrealistic in most settings – e.g., while
ex-post is too informed, ex-ante is too uninformed. Consequently an ex-
interim information-set – where the participants know their own value, but
have only probabilistic information about all the values of other bidders –
attempts a “Goldilocks” formulation between the other two. However, such
a set is computationally challenging compared to the other two, because
it possesses neither the simplification of full information, nor of everything
being performed in a simple expectation.
2.2.2 Simplification Via the Potential Profit
One contribution of this work is a novel information-set definition that has
the tractability of an ex-post measure, but the economic intuition of an
ex-interim measure.
In considering what information-set to use, we focus on the information
a participant both needs and has in making his decision about how to inter-
act with the mechanism. In practice, bidders are boundedly informed and
boundedly rational, and we want a model that captures this.
It seems reasonable to assume that participants know not only their
own value for a bundle of goods, but also what they will pay for a bundle,
conditioned on bidding for it and winning it. Further, that they know they
may lose the bundle, and in fact may have an idea of how likely this is, as
a function of their bid report.
Dispite its common use in analysis, it is generally unreasonable to assume
participants know the exact (ex-post) values of other bidders for all bundles,
or even for the allocated bundle. However, firms often have some idea of their
opponents’ business plans – after all, they are typically in the same industry.
And thus they may have distributional information about the values of their
opponents. That is, they may be able to view their competition as having
been sampled from some IID population of competitors.
However, as it turns out, we can conveniently summarize all of this infor-
mation into a single unidimensional property: the distribution on available
profit under the VCG rule to a given participant. As we shall see, it is
this distribution that really captures the competitive environment a partic-
ipant finds himself in. Formally we have the following (proofs are left to
Appendix B):
Observation 1. Holding the bids of the other players vˆ-i constant, each
winning bid vˆi has two additive components: (1) an amount v
C
i that by
definition is needed or the bidder will lose his bundle and (2) an amount
ψ ≥ 0 in excess of this.
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Observation 1 lets us focus, not on the joint trade and reported valua-
tion profile when considering a bidder’s bid (and subsequent payment), but
instead solely on the amount ψ, the amount over the critical value that is
offered in the bid. ψ is strictly positive, because were it to ever run negative,
the bidder would have reported below its critical value, and lost the bundle.
Observation 2. For VCG, ψ = piV CGi = ∆V CGi in equilibrium (e.g. the VCG
profit is the discount in equilibrium).
Observation 2 lets us give ψ a useful name and interpretation: the bid-
der’s profit as calculated by the VCG Rule (but in general, not necessarily at
truthful bids of others). In VCG, where i is truthful, this will be equivalent
to the VCG discount. Alternatively, we can view ψ as the amount of surplus
attributable to i at his reported value, be that truthful or otherwise. We
refer to ψ as the potential profit, i.e. the amount VCG would offer, even if
our eventual rule often will not be able to provide this much and maintain
its other requirements (such as budget balance).
In general, ψ should be consided to be taken relative to the reported
values of other players, i.e. when they behave in equilibrium. But it is cal-
cuated at the true value of the player whose incentives are being considered.
That is, as ψ = v(λi) − vCi , the first term is i’s truthful value, while the sec-
ond term is i’s critical value, which is independent of i and is taken at the
equilibrium reports of the other agents. In other words, it is the amount an
agent would make if it told the truth, everyone else played the equilibrium,
and the mechanism was charging this particular bidder as if it were VCG.
As we shall see, this unusual structure enables us to capture both i’s true
value and the environmental conditions i faces simultaneously.
Observation 3. Out of equilibrium but above vCi the reported discount ψ =
∆ˆV CGi (e.g. the VCG formula evaluated at a non-truthful bid) shifts by
exactly the amount of the misreport, such that the true profit remains the
same, pˆiV CGi = piV CGi .
Every closed-form payment rule reported in the literature to date, in-
cluding VCG, Threshold, Small, Large, etc, can be expressed as ∆(ψ), the
discount supplied when the report is ψ above vCi (Parkes et al. 2001). Thus
ψ is a convenient way to parametrize a payment rule, and for the same
reasons it is a convenient way to think about the information available to
a bidder. For example, VCG has a characteristic signature when viewed
from this perspective: the discount supplied rises one-for-one with ψ, which
Observation 3 reveals to have the effect of keeping the profit constant re-
gardless of the report. It is this that ultimately makes VCG strategyproof.
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Non-incentive compatible rules won’t have this property. But by focusing
on profit under a given rule as a function of ψ, we capture bidders’ incentive
structure perfectly, conditioned on the behavior of other players and upon
the allocation remaining fixed.
2.2.3 The Distribution of Potential Profit
Because we want to do design in BNE, we must be able to reason about the
distribution on possible participant values, rather than a specific outcome.
Consequently, we let f(ψ) represent a distribution over the potential profit
that the bidder would obtain if he were paying the VCG rule, given the
reported behavior (under the actual mechanism being used, not VCG) of
the other bidders, and conditioned on winning λ∗i . It is thus dependent on
the reports of the other agents, as well as dependent on the true value of
agent i.
The distribution is over many counterfactual instantiations of the market
domain drawn IID from some consistent underlying generation process. In
the real world, such a distribution may be built up by considering the many
examples in a repeated game if the dynamic process is reasonably stationary.
Alternatively, one can model the participants and view the distribution as
having been constructed from many instances drawn from a synthetic bid
generator.
Our model is consistent with the distribution over the rest of the agent’s
value either occurring at truth, or having been calculated according to the
BNE of the resulting overall market mechanism. In a synthetic context, us-
ing the truth-based distribution will be easier, as finding the reported values
of the other agents would require solving for the BNE of the mechanism.
However, in a repeated real-world game, the observed bids are presumably
approximately equilibrium bids (depending on the sophistication of the play-
ers), making the equilibrium-based distribution the easier version to obtain.
Our rule is not agnostic to this distinction: it will provide different rules
depending on the calculated f . It is, however, well-defined and consistent
for both. We will focus on the version where the other agents are bidding in
equilibrium, because we view this as the more natural instantiation of the
mechanism.
2.2.4 The Blinded Regret Information-Set
If bidders know ψ exactly and they know the payment rule in place, they
have ex-post information – they know exactly the topology of the incentive
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structure they face. This is exactly equivalent to their knowing their critical
value exactly, which is functionally equivalent to knowing the bid values of all
the other agents in the winning allocation. They can then behave optimally,
bidding exactly their critical value, which, under any individually rational
payment scheme, should give them maximum profit. Clearly this ex-post
structure is undesirable. The construction of f alone does not ameliorate
this: f tells us how frequently a given value of ψ occurs, but if agents know
this exact value when they choose their report, we are still in an ex-post
scenario. By contrast, if bidders must choose their report based only on
knowing f in aggregate, but not which particular value of ψ they directly
face, we have an ex-ante condition – the bidder has no concrete knowledge
of his own value. For the reasons described in section 2.2.1, neither of these
extremes is desirable.
We would prefer an information-set that behaves more like an ex-interim
condition. Our solution is to adopt an explicit model of the uncertainty that
the bidder has about the value of joint bids, which we call the blinding dis-
tribution. More specifically, given that f represents the actual distribution
of VCG-rule profits available in the mechanism, we use a structure where
bidders only have a guess about what their particular profit, ψ, is, condi-
tional on the overall actual distribution being f . The blinding distribution
µx(ψ) represents the bidder’s belief about the value of ψ, conditioned on x
being the true ψ. We then compound µx with f to produce
g(ψ) = ∫ f(x)µx(ψ)dx (1)
and it is then this function, g, which we assume the bidders have access to,
not f . In the experiments in section 4, we use a truncated Normal for µx.
This approach allows us to smoothly interpolate between an ex-ante con-
dition, which occurs when µx is the uniform distribution and the expected
ex-post regret, which occurs when µx is the Dirac δ distribution. Cases be-
tween these, e.g. when µx is Normal, represent an interim information state.
This state is not identical to that defined in the richer ex-interim deviation
incentive (see Appendix A, although intuitively they both lie between ex-
ante and expected ex-post).
2.2.5 Blinded Regret Approximate Incentive Compatibility
Given the attractive information-set just described, knowlege of g and of the
payment rule in place, we can quantify how much incentive an agent has to
modify his bid away from truth, the Blinded Regret Deviation Incentive:
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BlindedRegretDIi = ∫ max
vˆi
[pii(vˆi, ψ˜)] g(ψ˜)dψ˜ − ∫ pii(vi, ψ)f(ψ)dψ (2)
where ψ˜ is bidder i’s belief about his potential profit, when he has been
blinded by some distribution µ that has been compounded with f to form
g by equation 1. Further, pii(vˆi, ψ˜) is the true profit to bidder i under the
actual rule being evalated, when he reports vˆi and his available potential
profit is ψ˜. The first term then represents the amount the bidder believes
he can profit by best misreporting under the blinded regret information-
set. The second term is the amount bidder i can profit if he simply reports
the truth in the mechanism. Thus the difference is the potential gain of
the bidder when he best responds. Given this definition of approximate
incentive compatibility, we next turn to the construction of optimal rules by
this criterion.
2.3 Optimal Approximately Incentive Compatible Payment
Rules
If we want to computationally obtain a perfectly IC payment rule, we can
cast the problem as an Automated Mechanism Design (Conitzer and Sand-
holm 2004), as we do in Appendix C. However, the full problem is hope-
lessly intractable for any but the simplest of instances. But, by focusing
on ψ instead of on the full trade and allocation space, we have reduced the
complexity of the payment function definition massively. Contingent on the
other bidders being fixed and on winning the bid, this reduction has been
without loss and is perfectly consistent with all prior closed-form rules in
the literature, and is consequently the approach we take here.
We will find it convenient to work with functions that move in the same
direction as payments, unlike the discounts used so far. Consequently, we
define r(ψ) = ψ − ∆(ψ). This function represents the amount the agent
is asked to pay above the critical value (which he must alway pay in any
reasonable mechanism). Consequently, the final payment the agent is asked
to make will be pi = vCi + r(ψ) = vCi + r(vˆi − vCi ). Further, this function
has a useful interpretation as the ex-post regret a bidder has for reporting
vCi +ψ for λi instead of reporting exactly the critical value vCi , which for all
IR payment rules is the optimal report (i.e. r represents the potential gain
if the agent were able to making the ex-post optimal report). We note that
all existing closed-form rules treat all bidders symmetrically, and using r(ψ)
enables us to do the same by applying the same payment rule to all bidders.
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Our task, then, is to identify payment rules r that are optimal under the
blinded regret approximate IC criterion we have just identified.
2.3.1 The Ex-Ante Variational Problem
We first copnsider the case where the blinding distribution µx is Uniform
over the full domain and thus, after blinding, the agent has no concrete infor-
mation about his true value. This case corresponds to an ex-ante condition.
Moreover, we restict ourselves to the case where the bidder adopts a strategy
where he chooses but a single “shade” parameter s ∈ R by which to offset
his true bid in the mechanism (and we generalize this in the next section).
In this case, the bidder’s problem becomes an unconstrained non-convex
optimization in one dimension:
arg min
s
∫ (Iψ≥sr(ψ − s) + Iψ<sψ) f(ψ)dψ (3)
where f(ψ) is a distribution over the profit that the bidder would obtain
if he were paying under the VCG rule (and everyone else is in equilbrium),
and s is the amount that the agent shades his report down from, below his
true value, and I is the indicator function.
In (3), f is used to construct an expectation for the regret the bidder
retains for reporting vCi +ψ−s instead of the ideal vCi when s is small enough
that he still wins, plus his regret over the full potential profit in the case
where the bidder has shaded so much that he has lost the bid. By minimizing
this aggregate regret, the bidder is simultaneously maximizing his expected
reward.4
The structure of the center’s problem is specific to the mechanism being
designed, and so we now specialize to budget-balanced CEs. We have a
constrained linear-variational program:
arg min
r
∫ r(ψ)f(ψ)dψ Regret at truth (4)
s.t. ∫ r(ψ − s)f(ψ)dψ ≥ k BB
0 ≤ r(ψ) ≤ ψ∀ψ ∆V CG& IR
The variable in this variational program r ∶ R → R is picked to minimize
the expected regret the bidder will face when bidding truthfully. The first
4Because we have inverted this optimization for clarity of exposition, our problem now
appears to be a min-min problem; but note that due to the structure of the coupling
between this and the subsequent problem, we do indeed still have a min-max problem.
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constraint ensures that the total regret when the bidder shades must be at
least k. For a suitably chosen k this ensures that a sufficiently small amount
of discount be doled out, such that budget balance can be achieved. Next
we constrain the rule to ensure that no discount is negative (or equivalently,
r(ψ) ≤ ψ), as a negative discount implies you must pay more than your
report, violating individual rationality for truthful bids. Lastly, we include
any additional constraints from the setting we need, as additional restrictions
on r. Here we include the restriction that discounts must be no greater than
VCG (or equivalently, r(ψ) ≥ 0), to be consistent with the other rules from
the literature. We will return to this setup in Section 4 to illustrate its
solution in a typical environment.
2.3.2 The Blinded Regret Variational Problem
Now we turn to realizing the more complex case where we both have a
blinding distribution, and where the bidder’s strategy is defined as a function
s(ψ), rather than a simple constant. With this change we obtain:
arg min
s
∫ (Iψ≥s(ψ)r(ψ − s(ψ)) + Iψ<s(ψ)ψ) g(ψ)dψ (5)
Note that in this formulation as we let µx → δ we will move into an expected
ex-post regret world and the bidder will be able to respond optimally for
every ψ. The solution then becomes s(ψ) = ψ, with the bidder reporting
exactly vCi everytime. We thus ensure that we always choose µx such that
it always has a non-zero variance.
In concert with this change for the bidder, a few updates are in order
for the center as well. First, if the bidder is reasoning based on partial
information, it makes sense for the center to use g in its objective also, so it
is attempting to incentivize the agent based upon the information-set that
the bidder will ultimately use. Second, the assumption that the center has a
perfect model of the bidder’s strategy is also too strong. To relax it, we adopt
a blinding distribution wx(ψ) for the center as well, and apply the resulting
compound distribution h(ψ) in the budget-balance constraint. h can either
model uncertainty on the center’s part about f , or equivalently, uncertainty
about the choice of s(⋅) that the bidder will employ. Both are available
from the same formulation because s can be moved into the argument of the
distribution function in place of r by a suitable change of variables in the
integration, making the two interpetations valid upon the same expression
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simultaneously. Putting this together, we obtain:
arg min
r
∫ r(ψ)g(ψ)dψ Regret at truth (6)
s.t. ∫ r(ψ − s(ψ))h(ψ)dψ ≥ k BB
0 ≤ r(ψ) ≤ ψ∀ψ ∆V CG& IR
The use of blinding distributions significantly improves the realism of our
model, moving us solidly into a partial information setting.
2.3.3 Analysis via Variational Methods
Our formulation has provided us with several variational optimization prob-
lems. Our first step is to construct the necessary boundary conditions. Our
restriction that 0 ≤ r(ψ) ≤ ψ, forcing the rule to be IR and within the
discount envelope of VCG, provides a necessary such condition.
With these in place, we might ideally be able to use the Euler-Lagrange
equation to transform our optimization problems into sets of differential
equations and then solve these for the optimal functions (Wan 1995). But
because, Euler-Lagrange can only be applied where we have a non-linear
variational form involving at least one set of derivatives, a general closed-
form solution is not available by this path.
However, the literature on Variational forms does extend to this case,
and offers us the following important insight (Wan 1995): We should expect
the function that is the solution to problems with our structure, to always
lie on one bound or the other (e.g. the optimal r(ψ) will either be 0 or ψ∀ψ
pointwise). This immediately shows that rules such as the current state-of-
the-art Threshold rule, that take on intermediate values, will not be optimal
under our criteria. Rules such as Small or Large are admitted in the class,
but the class is far larger than just these existing rules. Additionally, if we
know the shape that r should take (e.g. Large), we can in fact use variational
methods to solve for the parameters of this shape.
2.3.4 Characterization as a Stackelberg Meta-Game
We note that the formulations provided in the previous two sections are are
in fact min-max functional programs: the center first minimizes over pay-
ment functions the expected deviation incentive functional; but this func-
tional is itself a maximization over potential bidder misreports of the bidder’s
expected gain in profit over being truthful. Because the two problems are
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inter-dependent and push in opposite directions, they can be interpreted
as a 2-player game. Specifically, since there is a distinct first-mover in the
form of the center, who must credibly declare the rules it will use before the
bidders then participate, formally we have a Bayesian Stackelberg game.
See Basar and Olsder (1995) for details on Stackelberg games. This is, in
fact, a general property of the task of mechanism design. We can view the
design process itself as a Stackelberg game: the designer/center chooses a
mechanism that provides properties she likes best. The players who then
participate within the chosen design move second and attempt to maximize
their own reward, within the structure they have been given. In otherwords,
there is a Stackelberg meta-game whose outcome determines not only play
in the eventual actual game (the second move), but also the choice of game
to be played itself (the first move).
Stackelberg games are typically solved by backwards induction, where
we solve for the optimal behavior of the second-mover first, and then find the
first-mover’s strategy that would maximize his reward given the behavior of
the second player. Given that moves in our meta-game are the choice of a
continuous one-dimensional function (r and s respectively), such a backward
induction process is prohibitively expensive, even after the above simplifica-
tions we have employed. So rather than trying to directly solve the min-max
stochastic functional program needed to find the outcome of the Stackelberg
meta-game directly, we recast the problem as two separate and opposed op-
timization problems: one for the bidder’s goal of maximizing his expected
profit, and another for the center’s goal of minimizing incentives to misre-
port. This enables us to solve for the outcome of the BNE of the meta-game
with traditional iterated best-response methods. The result, though, will be
a BNE of the meta-game, not necessarily a Stackelberg equilibrium of the
meta-game. The true Stackelberg equilibria will be those BNE that have
maximum value for the first mover (in our case the center). In our numer-
ical experiments, we have not been able to identify more than one stable
equilibrium, and so we report on the single equilbria we have identified.
3 Methods
3.1 Parametric Distributions for f , µ and w
While it is entirely possible to define f by an empirical distribution, in
practice it will often be convenient to use a parametric form instead. Because
V ∗ and V ∗-i are constructed from a maximization process, their distributions
are well-modeled by Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distributions (Coles
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et al. 2001). We are interested in the distribution of the difference in these
values, ∆V CGi for a truthful bid, because by Observation 3, this is equal to
the VCG payoff. Because the difference of uncorrelated GEV variables is a
Logistic distribution, one might think that a Logistic would be appropriate.
However, these variables are highly correlated. Intead it is more appropriate
to think of V ∗ as an exceedence over the threshold of V ∗-i . A model of this
form results in a Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) (Pickands III 1975)
for f . This is consistent with previous work that has fit the distribution of
VCG payoffs in a CE setting empirically, and found that it well matched
the GPD (Lubin and Parkes 2009).5We also note that the GPD is a limiting
case model, and other distributions are certainly possible in practice. We
therefore also consider the Burr XII distribution which generalizes the GPD
and the Log-Logistic model (Burr 1942); it is an attractive choice as it has
been used to model income distributions, which is effectively what the VCG
profit represents (Champernowne 1952).
In our experiments, we use simple truncated normal distributions for
both µ and w. More complex models of bidder information could easily be
incorporated, but in the absence of a specific context, we opt for a simple
distributions.
3.2 Finding the BNE of the Meta-Game
Ultimately, we will need to solve for the equilibrium of our game. For finite
domains, min-max programming techniques might suffice (Aissi et al. 2009).
However, our problem has infinite support, and thus we employ iterated
best response techniques, which go all the way back to Cournot and Fisher
(1897). Specifically, we proceed in rounds where we find the best response
for each player to the strategy employed by their opponent in the previous
round. For recent treatments of such techniques in settings similar to our
own, see Reeves et. al. and Vorobeychik et al. (2004, 2008). Our numerical
approach employs a damped form of this method, i.e. with fictitious play
(Robinson 1951, Brown 1951). As Shapley noted 1964, this procedure may
fail to converge with cycles of best-responses repeating themselves. But, we
have been able to force convergence in most cases by imposing suitable (and
5We note that that the exponential distribution is a special case of the GPD (where
shape parameter is 0). As shown in Appendix D, the ratio of f(ψ − s) to f(ψ) drives the
determination of our eventual payment rule. Because the exponential distribution has a
fixed failure rate, the ratio of fixed offsets of its pdf is a constant. This means that all
feasible rules are possible solutions when f is exactly an exponential, under the simpler
ex-ante model of Section 2.3.1. This is not true for the more complicated subsequent
model.
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reasonable) additional boundary conditions, and by leveraging the numerical
advantages that happen to come along with the smoothing associated with
the blinding distributions described in section 2.2.4.
Next, we describe how we find the best response for each of our varia-
tional problems by an appropriate numerical method:
3.3 The Bidder Problem
For the optimal strategy formulation of section 2.3.1 where s is a constant,
we need only solve a 1-D non-convex optimization to find s ∈ R. Because
the problem is unconstrained, it suffices to employ a Brent Line Optimizer
(Brent 2013). We note only that it will often be the case that there will
be multiple minima with near-equal values. The numerical stability of the
algorithm is improved if such ties are broken in a consistent way, e.g. by
always picking the minima closest to zero (which is a reasonable assumption
for bidder behavior anyway). To implement this, it suffices to perform a
simple grid search for potential minima, local search via the Brent solver
to improve these results, and then pick the closest to s = 0 within the
equivalence class of minimal solutions. In the more complex formulation of
section 2.3.2 where s(ψ) is a function, we simply discretize ψ into B bins
and run the above method on each. We then approximate s(ψ) as a simple
linear interpolation over these points.
3.4 The Center Problem
The Center’s problem is more complicated as a constrained variational pro-
gram. Nonetheless, if again we discretize ψ into B bins, it is straightforward
to then cast the problem as an LP that can be solved with e.g. CPlex. The
standard version (section 2.3.1) of the problem is then as follows:
min
rb∶b∈B∑b∈B(F (b) − f(b))rb Regret at truth (7)
s.t. ∑
b∈B(F (b) − F (b))rb−s(b) ≥ k BB
0 ≤ rb ≤ b∀b ∈ B ∆V CG& IR
Where b, b and b are the lower, mid and upper points of bin b respectively,
and where suitable boundary conditions are in place to ensure that the
indexing stays within range regardless of the s function. The more complex
version of the problem is identical but uses the compound h distributions
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instead of f . In both cases we ultimately construct a continuous version of
r from the discrete by simple linear interpolation.
As it turns out, there is also a greedy method available that solves the
above problem exactly. In the interest of space, we defer the details to
Appendix D.
4 Experiments
To validate this approach, we have conducted a series of experiments, using
parametrized distributions for f . Leveraging the methods described in the
previous section, we can quickly compute the necessary equilibria. With
suitable configuration, all experiments converge in less than 50 rounds and
run in a few minutes on an Intel Core i5. In all of the experiments that
follow we have used a discretization of 50 bins and 200-fold sub-sampling
when evaluating integrals over the bins. In all cases, we evaluated ψ over a
range [0,10]. Consequently all distributions were truncated such that their
support did not exceed this range.
4.1 Ex-Ante, f ∼ Pareto
For the first experiment we used the basic ex-ante formulation from sec-
tion 2.3.1. We equipped it with a Generalized Pareto Distribution for f with
position 0, and scale 1. We then varied the shape parameter in {−.1,0.01,1}.
We find that the optimal strategy for the bidder under all three settings is
to shade by 0.2. The rules produced under this setting are shown in Fig-
ure 1. For a shape parameter of −.1, the calculated rule charges only the
bidders with small ψ. Consequently, the rule selected in this case is the
Large rule, which gives all the available surplus to bidders with large poten-
tial VCG profit. By contrast, when the scale parameter is 1, a heavy-tailed
distribution, the obtained rule asks only those bidders with the largest ψ to
pay. Accordingly, this parametrization selects the Small rule, which gives
all the available surplus to bidders with the smallest VCG potential profits.
In previous work (Lubin and Parkes 2009), it was found that the GPD well-
matched empirical data, and that the Small rule was observed to perform
exceedingly well in restricted BNE. From these figures, we can see why. If
the GPD distribution has a positive shape parameter, then the optimal rule,
under our model, is likewise Small.
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Figure 1: Ex-ante payments above the
critical value for several examples of the
Pareto shape parameter.
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Figure 2: Ex-ante payments above the
critical value for a Pareto distribution,
varying the fraction of required regret,
i.e. γ = {.25, .50, .75}
4.2 Ex-Ante, f ∼ Pareto For Different Budgets
The budget balance constraint described in section 2.3.1 enforces that the
rule cannot dole out more surplus than is available in the domain, k. VCG
violates this and gives out enough surplus to achieve full strategyproofness,
an amount we can quantify as: kV CG = ∫ ψf(ψ)dψ. Because of this it is
convenient to consider reparametrizing in terms of this quantity and focus
on the constant γ = k
kV CG
∈ [0,1]. γ represents the fraction of the total VCG
surplus that must not be given away if we are to achieve budget balance.
All things equal, the larger γ, the more the agents are going to have to pay.
This can clearly be seen in Figure 2, which shows the bidder payments above
the critical value where γ ∈ {.25, .50, .75}. Further, the more surplus there
is to hand out, the better the rule can do in minimizing the incentives to
deviate, and thus the optimal strategy falls from shaving by 0.2 when γ = .75
to 0.1 when γ = .25. Addtional results based on the ex-ante formulation, are
provided in Appendix E.
4.3 Blinded-Regret and Functional Strategy, f ∼ Pareto
Finally, we turn our attention to our more complex formalism described in
sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.2. Figure 3 illustrates an example from this setup
with f ∼ GPD(0,1,1) and µ drawn from four different Normal Distributions.
These 3-D plots show the payment above the critical value that a bidder faces
both as a function of ψ, or potential profit (right axis), and as a function
of potential shade he might make at that value ψ (left axis). The figures
make clear that the 1-D payment function offsets back and to the right, as
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(a) µ ∼ Normal(0,2) (b) µ ∼ Normal(0,5)
(c) µ ∼ Normal(0,10) (d) µ ∼ Normal(0,1000)
Figure 3: Optimal Blinded Regret payments above the critical value as func-
tion of both VCG potential profit and bidder strategy. Here f ∼GPD(0,1,1) and
µ ∼Normal, as specified. The optimal strategy is shown as the grey vertical surface.
the agent increases his shade.
We hasten to note that the pyramid region on the left is not technically
part of the payment rule itself. Rather, in that region, the bidder has shaded
more than his VCG potential profit, and has thus issued a bid below the
critical value. Consequently, he is now losing, and incurring a regret equal
to his full potential profit. The region rises as it goes to the right and back,
since bidders with higher values have potentially more to lose.
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Figure 4: Optimal Blinded Regret payments above the critical value scaled by the
f distribution and plotted as a function of both VCG potential profit and bidder
strategy. Here f ∼GPD(0,1,1) and µ ∼ Normal(0,5). The optimal strategy is shown
as the grey vertical surface. The mean regret for a constant strategy is plotted on
the left in blue, and is similar, though certainly not identical to the curve.
Cutting through each of the figures, you can see a vertical surface. This
is a rendering of the optimal strategy taken by the bidder (under the in-
formation set he has available), when confonted with this rule. One can
see that the amount of shaving generally increases with the VCG potential
profit that an agent has, but that the surface is not at 45 degrees, since the
bidder only has partial information about his value of ψ, as enforced by the
blinding distribution, µ. Interestingly, in the Figures 3(a) and 3(b), we can
see the optimal strategy “hook” around the mass of additional payment at
the far right of the plot. For µ with large standard deviations, such as in
Figures 3(c) and 3(d), the bidder doesn’t have enough information about his
setting to be able to do this. Moreover, Figure 3(d) is included to illustrate
that as the µ approaches the Uniform Distribution, the agent has effectively
only ex-ante information, and thus chooses a constant shade (illustrating
how the blinded regret formalism generalizes the ex ante approach.
The small dip that can be seen in the rule obtained in figure 3(a) is not
an artifact, but a feature of the equilibrium of high-information set games
(e.g. those with µ distributions with low standard deviation). The more
information the bidder has, the more effective he is at contorting his bid,
and the more complex the center’s chosen payment rule must be in order to
attempt to thwart this strategizing. This illustrates that approximate incen-
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tive schemes under even simplified Bayesian conditions can still be highly
complex for even moderately-informed bidders. This complexity stems from
bidders understanding their strategic environment for exploitation. This
has implications for market design in general: we want bidders to be able
to easily calculate their valuation function, and to be able to bid based on
it – otherwise efficiency suffers. But, we do not want bidders to know their
VCG potential profit ψ, because knowledge of this informs them of their
critical point, which in turn enables them to strategize. Concretely, this
means agents must be kept in the dark about the values of their competi-
tors, which may be hard in small markets where agents can reason directly
about individual competitors.
Figure 4 shows the same example as Figure 3(b), but where the payments
have been scaled by the f distribution. Although slightly more difficult to
read than Figure 3, this approach lets you see precisely the topology that
drives the decisions made by both the bidder and the center. The figure
illustrates the fundamental tradeoff faced by the optimizers for a falling
distribution like GPD: small values of ψ occur frequently, so even though
they are small they are important. Large values of ψ occur rarely, but their
sheer size can make them important too. Ultimately, both sides of the game
must pay attention to the full range in equilibrium.
5 Discussion
Although there are numerous domains where combinatorial exchanges could
provide tangible economic benefits, including spectrum reallocation and
computational resource allocation, a significant obstacle has prevented them
from being used in practice: a reasonable payment rule with good incentive
properties.
In this work, we have presented the first comprehensive method for con-
structing such a rule. To do so, we have employed a construction that re-
duces the complexity of the payment rule design problem to a single dimen-
sion, by appealing to the same principles that enable the VCG mechanism
to be strategyproof. In particular, the rule is defined as a single dimensional
function, whose argument is the amount in excess of the critical value the
participant has bid, and whose result is the amount in excess of the critical
value that he is then asked to pay. This amount is always exactly zero for
VCG, but for our rules it is a positive number for at least some bidders
such that in total the budget balance constraint can be met, while simulta-
neously attaining our definition of approximate incentive compatibility. In
this sense, it reduces to a payment rule that directly reasons about the profit
that agents obtain for their allocated bundle, without worrying about the
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combinatorial complexities that lead to that bundle being chosen
In conjunction with this, we have also constructed a corresponding model
for bidder behavior, again reduced to the single dimension of bidder profit.
With this reduction, we are in a position to offer a novel definition of ap-
proximate incentive compatibility, where we consider the increased profit
an agent might attain by optimally misreporting based on a distribution of
the available potential VCG profit in the domain, when the other agents
are playing their Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies. Rather than assuming
agents have direct access to this distribution, which would result in an ex-
post information set, we instead introduce a “blinding” distribution, which
represents an agent’s bounded knowledge about its potential profitability in
the domain. By compounding the blinding distribution with the potential
VCG profit distribution, we obtain our model of agents’ fuzzy knowledge of
their domain. This model has the advantage of the tractability of a single-
dimensional ex-post analysis, while retaining much of the economic structure
of a far more desirable ex-interim model.
By combining this model for the center and for the agents together, we
can construct the full mechanism. This mechanism operates exactly like
VCG, except that it calculates different prices. These prices are based on
particular distributional information about how agents bid in equilibrium,
and about a given agent’s true value relative to its critical value (i.e. its true
VCG discount). A critical contribution of this framing of the pricing problem
is that we cast the problem as a meta-game between the center and the
agents playing the game. We argue that this structure is a general property
of problems in mechanism design: the mechanism and the participants are
at odds with each other, each trying to box in the other in order to attain
its own goals.
To obtain concrete rules in our paradigm in the general case, it is neces-
sary to go beyond closed-form solutions and employ numerical methods to
solve for the equilibrium of the meta-game. Such solutions simultaneously
offer approximately IC payment rules under our new blinded regret infor-
mation set, and the optimal agent strategies when agents face these rules.
We offered such a numerical method, adapted from the traditional damped
interated best-response algorithm for solving BNEs. We then tested the ap-
proach on several distribution classes and a wide range of parametrizations,
including those that have previously been shown to be a good fit with real
data. Using these distributions we were able to generate the Large and Small
rules computationally, in precisely the settings where they have been shown
effective in practice. Moreover, going beyond these settings, our method
produces a wide variety of novel, yet easily implementable, payment rules.
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Appendices
A Existing formulations of approximate incentive
compatibility
The most widely used approximate incentive compatibility concept is the
Worst Case Ex-Post Regret :
WCRegreti = maxv-i maxvi maxvˆi [pii(vi, vˆi,v-i) − pii(c)]
This measures across all possible agent values and reports the most that an
agent might gain by misreporting, given what he knows after the mecha-
nism is complete. In other words, it is the “Full Information” setting, and
thus reduces our BNE to a regular Nash equilibrium. Importantly, though,
it will not minimize efficiency loss. Efficiency is a global criterion, seek-
ing to match total value (or equivalently expected value per participant) of
the reported and true allocations. WCRegret, by contrast seeks to mini-
mize the worst case difference in reported versus true allocative value for
individual participants, vi(λ∗i ) − vi(λˆi). A given mechanism may exhibit a
large such loss on certain participants in order to reduce the overall loss
in aggregate, thereby improving efficiency. Yet, the measure has the virtue
of being both understandable and easy to calculate. The definition works
well when it can be expected to be small in magnitude, hence its other
name (−strategyproofness – Roberts and Postlewaite, 1976). The current
state-of-the-art rule, Threshold (Parkes et al. 2001), minimizes this value,
e.g. L∞(∆,∆V CG). However, when, as in the case of CEs, we expect the
ex-post regret to be large, the measure is overly conservative: it tells us
solely about a very rare and very massive worst case – preventing us from
targeting the typical cases for design. High efficiency can require accepting
significant value loss to a tiny minority of individual participants, who incur
exceedingly poor WCRegret.
Consequently, we might instead an expectation over participant values
instead, yielding expected ex-post regret:
ECRegreti = Ev-iEvi max
vˆi
[pii(vi, vˆi,v-i) − pii(v)]
Beause it is still a full information analysis, this retains appealing computa-
tional properties. However, it consequently also retains an unrealistic infor-
mation set, requiring us to assume that participants have full information
about each other which is unrealistic in most settings.
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To improve the information assumptions, we instead may wish to con-
sider Ex-Ante Deviation Incentive (ADI):
ADIi = max
vˆi
[Evi [Ev-i[pii(vi, vˆi,v-i) − pii(v)]]]
In this formulation agents have only probabilistic information about the
value profile over all agents, including their own values. Thus the informa-
tion set is problematic for the opposite reason from an ex-post analysis: we
are now assuming agents know too little, rather than too much. But, be-
cause the expection over value of the other agents is taken relative to their
true values, not relative to their reports, formulating the distribution does
not require repeatedly solving for the BNE outcome. Consequently, ADI
is relatively computationally tractable, even though it typically will require
solving a winner determination problem within the stochastic optimization.
We therefore consider a pricing model based on this model, when adapted
to our methodology, in section 2.3.1.
What we really want, though, is an information set, where agents know
their own values exactly but the values of the other agents only in expecta-
tion. This yields the Ex-Interim Deviation Incentive (IDI):
IDIi = Evi [max
vˆi
[Ev-i[pii(vi, vˆi,v-i) − [pii(v)]]]
This represents a tremendous improvement in fidelity: if the expectation
over the values of others in the first term is instead taken relative to BNE
reports, then this would measure the value of the expected best-response
and directly calculates our gold-standard measure, trending to 0 as efficiency
goes to 1.6Despite this, typically the distribution is still taken relative to the
truthful reports, to match the definition of ex-ante, while adding only to the
information set participants’ knowledge of their own value. Regardless of
which distribution is considered, though, IDI is typically computationally
even more challenging than ex-ante since the maximization is now embeded
within a larger expectation.
6Evi [maxvˆi [Evˆ-i[pii(vi, vˆi, vˆ-i)] − Ev-i[pii(v)]]]
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B Proof of observations
Observation 1. (1) Follows directly from the definition of the critical value,
namely that when vˆi < vCi , then by definition Vˆ ∗(vˆ) < Vˆ ∗-i (vˆ-i) and the
marginal economy without i has greater value than the main economy and
λ∗-i will be chosen over λ∗. (2) Is immediate.
Observation 1. Follows from the definitions of pii, pi, and ∆
V CG
i and from
VCG being strategyproof.
Observation 3. Is equivalent to the foundational property of VCG that for
reports above vci (truthful or otherwise) i’s profit under VCG is his marginal
impact on the economy, a constant independent of the reported value vˆi ≥
vci ,
C Full computational mechanism design problem
Without the simplifications we employ in this papaer, the full Automated
Mechanism Design (Conitzer and Sandholm 2004) approach to the pricing
problem, would be to solve:
arg min
p∈{∏N P(M)×(∏N P(M)→∏N R)} maxi∈N ApproxSPGoali (8)
s.t. IR, Weak BB
where ApproxSPGoali is any of the deviation incentive measures from ap-
pendix A, or the new one definind in equation 2. Unfortunately though, the
variable in this program is a vector-valued (one entry per bidder) payment
function and the objective functional is a stochastic optimization containing
embedded winner determination problems. Thus, the program is intractable
for all but the most trivial of instances.7 Consequently, we seek to gain trac-
tion by a suitable simplification that will enable reasonable computation.
7See (Lubin 2010) for a simple example solved in a discretization of this formulation.
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D Ratio method for solving the center problem
Here we present an alternative way to solve the problem shown in Section 3.4.
Consider the following change of variables in the original continuous BB
constraint from (4): ψ → ψ − s:
∫ U+s
s
r(ψ)f(ψ − s)dψ ≥ k (9)
Now consider a starting choice for the r function r(⋅) = 0. We then wish
to modify r into r(ρ) =  for some ρ that will optimally progress towards
satisfying the BB constraint while simultaneously doing the least damage to
the objective function. To do so, we should choose
ρ = arg max
ψ
f(ψ − s)
f(ψ) (10)
because it is this ratio that determines where progress is best made trading
off adding to the constraint and to the objective.
This insight offers an alternative method to solve for r, provided in al-
gorithm 1. We can also plot this ratio to gain insight into what is driving
particular rule choices, as in Figure 5. Here we see a plot of the ratios, one
line for each of the distributions being considered. The plot shows a very dif-
ferent shape for each of the parametrizations. For −.1, a finite distribution,
the ratio slopes downwards and consequently the corresponding rule shown
in Figure 1 asks for payments from only the bidders with small ψ. The rule
selected in this case is the Large rule, which gives all the available surplus to
bidders with large VCG potential profits. As we described in section 2.2.3,
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Figure 5: Ex-ante pdf ratios plotted for several examples of the Pareto shape
parameter
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all possible rules consistent with the boundary and budget constraints are
valid for the Exponential Distribution under the basic ex-ante formulation.
By picking a shape parameter just larger then zero we can see the limit-
ing case of the GPD as it approaches the exponential distribution. In this
case the ratio is nearly flat (it would be perfectly flat for the Exponential
Distribution). When the scale parameter is 1, a heavy-tailed distribution,
the ratio is rising. This leads to a rule that asks only those bidders with
the largest ψ to pay. Accordingly, this parametrization selects the Small
rule, which gives all the available surplus to bidders with the smallest VCG
potential profits.
ALGORITHM 1: Find an approximate regret function by the ratio method
Input: A distribution f (or g), and strategy s ∈ R and required regret k
Output: A discretized regret function r
Create B discrete bins
ρb ← 1b−b ∫ bb f(x)f(x−s)dx
for b ∈ B in descending order of ρb do
z ← k
F (b)−F (b)
rb ← min( b , z)
k ← k − rbz
if k ≤ 0 then
break
end
end
return r
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E f ∼ Burr XII. a further Ex-Ante result
We have also run a series of experiments using a generalization of the Pareto
Distribution, known as the Burr XII Distribution, which has two shape-
parameters. When the first parameter is 1, the Burr XII Distribution is
the same as a Pareto Distribution. When the second parameter is 1, we
have a Log-Logistic Distribution (Burr 1942). Figure 6 shows the r function
obtained from a parametrization of (2,1), which produces a peaked distri-
bution in the family of Log-Logistic functions. Here we see that the bidders
near the peak receive their full VCG potential profit and obtain all the sur-
plus. The bidders with either small or large VCG potential profits are given
no discount at all. Essentially, this rule will give all of its surplus to a subset
of values in the middle. This example shows how dependent the outcome of
the optimal payment rule is on the shape of the distribution. Nonetheless,
the optimal strategy has not changed, and remains a shade of 0.2.
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Figure 6: Ex-ante payments above the critical value with a Burr XII distribution
parameterized as (2,1)
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